

















Countries	 that	 seek	 to	 provide	 universal	 health	 coverage	 deal	 with	
considerable	 publicly	 funded	 expenses.	 This	 article	 discusses	 if	 a	 private	 health	
insurance	 subsidy	 policy	 can	 reduce	 the	 expenses	 covered	 by	 the	 public	 system.	 A	
theoretical	 model	 is	 developed	 in	 which	 individuals	 are	 characterized	 by	 two	
dimensions:	 inherited	 risk	 of	 illness	 and	 preferences	 for	 prevention	 activities.	 It	 is	
shown	that	when	beneficiaries	of	a	voluntary	plan	have	lower	risk,	i.e.	advantageous	
selection	scenario,	a	subsidy	raises	heath	expenses	if	articulation	between	coverage	is	
complementary.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 in	 adverse	 selection	 scenarios	 a	 subsidy	 reduces	
expenditure	 if	 articulation	 is	 supplementary.	 Intermediate	 scenarios	 are	 also	
considered	 where	 articulations	 between	 coverages	 have	 both	 complementary	 and	
supplementary	 components,	 which	 is	 apparently	 the	 case	 for	 the	 Colombian	 health	
system.	 Calibrated	 numerical	 simulations	 are	 provided	 using	 the	 Colombian	 system	
data.	 The	 calibration	 strategy	 employed	 reveals	 that	 selection	 is	 adverse	 in	 the	
Colombian	voluntary	health	 insurance	market.	Furthermore,	we	 identify	 the	 level	of	




















Government	 intervention	 in	 health	 service	 markets	 and	 social	 security	 insurance	
schemes	 ሺhealth,	 pension,	 etc.ሻ	 is	 varied:	 it	 can	 go	 from	 direct	 provision	 of	 health	
services	to	regulation	of	private	markets.	Public	intervention	in	the	health	sector	can	
have	 a	 double	 purpose.	On	 the	 one	hand,	 State	 intervention	 tries	 to	 correct	market	
failures,	which	are	mainly	consequence	of	the	presence	of	asymmetric	information	in	
health	 insurance	 markets.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 lot	 of	 countries	 aim	 to	 provide	
universal	health	coverage,	but	at	 the	same	time	aim	to	hold	back	or	diminish	public	
health	 expenses,	 due	 to	 inefficiencies	 that	 could	 cause	 an	 excessive	 raise	 of	 public	
expenses.34	In	many	health	systems	where	public	and	private	coverages	coexist,	it	has	
been	 proposed	 to	 subsidize	 private	 insurance	 as	 a	 tool	 that	 allows	 iሻ	 to	 enlarge	
coverage	 against	 the	 financial	 risks	 caused	 by	 expenditures	 in	 health	 iiሻ	 to	 reduce	
expenses	 made	 by	 the	 public	 system	 because	 of	 the	 migration	 of	 individuals	 from	
public	to	private	coverage	plan.	
The	interaction	between	two	factors	seems	to	explain	whether	subsidies	to	voluntary	
plans	 increase	 or	 decrease	 public	 expenditure:	 1ሻ	 the	 nature	 of	 selection,	 that	 is,	 if	
individuals	 that	 purchase	 voluntary/private	 plans	 have	 a	 higher	 risk	 ሺadverse	
selectionሻ	 or	 lower	 risk	 ሺadvantageous	 selectionሻ	 relative	 to	 average	 risk	 of	 public	
system	beneficiaries;	2ሻ	the	nature	of	the	relationship,	or	articulation	between	public	
coverage	 and	 coverage	 provided	 by	 private	 health	 insurance	 contracts,	 that	 is,	 if	
private	contracts	complement	or	substitute	public	coverage.	When	the	articulation	is	
complementary,	 coverage	 by	 the	 private	 sector	 allows	 access	 to	 higher	 quality	
services,	but	also	pays	off	out‐of‐pocket	expenses	not	 covered	by	 the	public	 system.	









of	 health	 in	 achieving	 international	 development	 goals.	 It	 urges	 governments	 to	 move	 towards	
providing	all	people	with	access	to	affordable,	quality	health‐care	services.	
http://www.who.int/universal_health_coverage/un_resolution/en/ 










The	 discussion	 regarding	 the	 first	 factor	 has	 evolved	 around	 the	 presence	 of	
asymmetric	 information,	 which	 has	 a	 particular	 resonance	 in	 health	 insurance	
markets,	particularly	because	 its	consequence	 is	 that	markets	will	not	have	efficient	
allocations,	 at	 least	 in	 a	 first‐best	 perspective	 ሺRothschild	 and	 Stiglitz,	 1976;	Harris	
and	 Townsend,	 1981ሻ.	 Asymmetric	 information	 leads	 to	 scenarios	 of	 over	 or	
underinsurance	that	affects	the	possible	impact	of	the	subsidy	ሺPauly,	1974;	Einav	et	
al.,	 2010ሻ.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 subsidy	may	decrease	 the	 underinsurance	 caused	by	
adverse	 selection,	 or	 it	 can	 worsen	 the	 overinsurance	 caused	 in	 the	 event	 of	
advantageous	selection.	
A	 theoretical	 model	 is	 developed	 in	 order	 to	 analyze	 how	 the	 interaction	
between	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 selection	 of	 individuals	 who	 purchase	 voluntary	 health	
insurances	 and	 the	 articulation	 of	 public	 and	 private	 coverage	 affect	 public	
expenditure	 when	 voluntary	 insurances	 are	 subsidized.	 Basically,	 individuals	 can	
choose	to	have	public	coverage	only,	or	to	buy	a	private	coverage	that	offers	a	better	









selection	 are	 recreated,	 depending	 on	 the	 relative	weight	 of	 each	 dimension	 on	 the	
probability	of	 illness	and	the	willingness	to	pay	for	the	insurance,	which	determines	
the	 private	 insurance	 demand	 function.	 In	 the	 scenario	 of	 advantageous	 selection	
ሺrespectively	 adverse	 selectionሻ,	 average	 probability	 of	 illness	 of	 those	 individuals	
who	 purchase	 a	 private	 coverage	 plan	 is	 less	 ሺresp.	 moreሻ	 than	 the	 average	
probability	of	those	who	remain	with	public	coverage.	
Analytical	results	show	that	in	the	advantageous	selection	scenario,	a	subsidy	
increases	 expenses	 in	health	 care	 if	 coverage	 articulation	 is	 complementary.	On	 the	
contrary,	 in	 the	 adverse	 selection	 scenario,	 a	 subsidy	 decreases	 expenses	 if	
articulation	is	sufficiently	supplementary.	In	the	intermediate	scenarios,	subsidies	can	
have	 ambiguous	 consequences	 on	 the	 amount	 of	 public	 expenditure.	 Therefore,	we	
calibrate	 our	model	 using	 data	 from	 the	 Colombian	 health	 system,	which	 seems	 to	
have	 components	 of	 both	 complementary	 and	 supplementary	 in	 its	 articulation	
between	private	and	public	health	 coverage.	The	calibration	strategy	applied	allows	
us	to	determine	a	unique	level	of	articulation	for	each	selection	scenario	ሺadverse	or	
advantageousሻ.	 Also,	 our	 calibration	 exercise	 reveals	 that	 it	 is	 the	 adverse	 selection	
scenario	that	is	the	closest	to	the	observed	total	public	expenditure.	
Based	 on	 this	 calibration,	 numerical	 simulations	 are	 performed.	 They	 reveal	
that	a	scenario	of	adverse	selection	with	a	sufficiently	supplementary	articulation	 is	
the	 most	 promising	 for	 a	 subsidy	 program	 to	 contribute	 to	 diminish	 public	
expenditure.	 Being	 the	 articulation	 between	 public	 and	 private	 coverage	 a	 political	
decision,	 this	 simulation	 describes	 how	 that	 articulation	 can	 be	 used	 as	 an	
intervention	 tool,	 which	 together	 with	 a	 subsidy	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 decline	 of	 public	
expenses.	 If	 the	 selection	 is	 adverse,	 small	 changes	 in	 the	 level	 of	 complementarity	
ሺtoward	a	more	supplementary	scenariosሻ	and	subsidies	of	a	moderate	magnitude	can	
lower	public	expenditure.	On	the	contrary,	if	selection	is	advantageous,	even	under	a	
completely	 supplementary	 articulation,	 subsidies	 would	 increase	 public	 spending	
regardless	of	its	amount.	
This	 paper	 makes	 a	 contribution	 by	 proposing	 a	 bi‐dimensional	 model	 that	




and	 Webb,	 2001;	 Einav	 et	 al.,	 2010ሻ,	 which	 do	 not	 allow	 to	 recreate	 adverse	 and	
advantageous	 selection	within	a	unified	approach.	This	work	proposes	a	model	 that	
recreates	 both	 of	 the	 selection	 scenarios	 through	 a	 parameter	 that	 represents	 the	










insurance	 subsidy	 generates	 a	 net	 savings	 for	 the	 Australian	 government	 ሺCheng,	
2014ሻ	or	that	in	the	United	States	of	America,	for	each	dollar	of	tax	subsidies	for	care	
of	 the	 elderly,	Medicaid	 saves	 approximately	 $0.84	 ሺGoda,	 2011ሻ.	 Still,	 some	 of	 the	
literature	 has	 used	 dynamic	 models	 to	 show	 that	 complete	 removal	 of	 the	 tax	
subsidies	can	lead	to	a	partial	collapse	of	insurance	markets,	reduction	of	the	coverage	










a	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expense	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 selection	 and	 how	














the	 public	 insurance.	 The	 proportion	 of	 the	 expenses	 made	 by	 beneficiaries	 of	
coverage	 2	 that	 are	 covered	 by	 public	 insurance	 is	α	 with	 0 ൑ α ൏ 1	 while	 a	
proportion	 of	 1 െ α	 is	 covered	 by	 the	 private	 insurance.	 This	 means	 that	 α	 is	 the	
parameter	 that	 represents	 the	articulation	between	 the	 two	coverages.	The	 types	of	
articulation	that	there	can	be	depend	on	α:		
	
− Purely	supplementary:	This	case	corresponds	to	α ൌ 0.	In	other	words,	the	only	
expenses	 covered	 by	 the	 public	 systems	 are	 the	 ones	 generated	 by	
beneficiaries	of	coverage	1.		
	
− Purely	 complementary:	 It	 corresponds	 to	 α ൌ Xଵ/Xଶ.	 In	 such	 a	 case,	 public	
insurance	 covers	 a	 proportion	 of	 the	 expenses	 made	 by	 beneficiaries	 of	
coverage	2	when	αXଶ ൌ Xଵ.7	
	
− Complementary‐supplementary:	 It	 corresponds	 to	 values	 of	 α	 such	 that	
0 ൏ α ൏ Xଵ/Xଶ.	 In	 this	 intermediate	 scenario,	 public	 insurance	 covers	 a	
proportion	 of	 the	 expenses	 generated	 by	 beneficiaries	 of	 coverage	 2	 when	










the public  insurance to take on a  larger coverage  for a  fraction of the people that can purchase a private 
insurance, which corresponds to the higher‐income fraction. Therefore, α should be subject to αXଶ ൌ Xଵ. 
unknown	 by	 the	 insurance	 company.	 φ	 represents	 preventive	 attitudes	 or	 self‐
protection	activities	 that	 individuals	may	 carry	out.	These	may	be	healthy	habits	or	
self‐care	 interventions	 that	 decrease	 probabilities	 of	 future	 illness.8	 9	 Even	 though	
these	 two	 dimensions	 that	 differentiate	 individuals	 have	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	
individual’s	 willingness	 to	 pay	 for	 coverage	 Xଶ,	 they	 have	 opposite	 effects	 on	 the	
probability	of	illness.		
	
The	population	 is	defined	by	a	 joint	distribution	Fሺθ, φሻ	with	θ, φ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ.	We	
define	 ω ൌ ωሺθ,φሻ	 as	 the	 function	 that	 represents	 individual’s	 preferences	 for	
insurance,	where		∂ω ∂θ ൐ 0⁄ 	 and	 ∂ω ∂φ⁄ ൐ 0.	 In	 addition,	we	 define	 h ൌ hሺθ, φሻ	 as	




benefit	from	coverage	2.		uଵሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ	and	uଶሺθ୧, φ୧; Pଶሻ	denote	individual	i’s	utility	level	from	having	coverage	1	or	2	respectively,	with	uଶሺθ୧, φ୧; Pଶሻ	strictly	decreasing	on	Pଶ.	Taking	into	account	what	has	been	previously	stated,	individuals	choose	coverage	2	if	
and	only	 if	 	uଶሺθ୧, φ୧; Pଶሻ ൒ uଵሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ,	 i.e.	 if	 they	obtain	a	greater	 level	of	utility	with	coverage	 2	 than	 with	 coverage	 1.	 We	 define	 wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ≡ maxሼPଶ|uଶሺθ୧, φ୧; Pଶሻ ൒uଵሺθ୧, φ୧ሻሽ,	 the	maximum	price	 that	 individual	 i	 is	willing	 to	pay	 in	 order	 to	benefit	
from	 coverage	 2.	 wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ 	 ∈ ൣw,w൧	 where	 w	 and	 w	 are	 the	 lower	 and	 upper	
boundaries,	 respectively,	of	 the	distribution	of	wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ,	which	 is	represented	 in	the	following	expression:	
	
wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ൌ ωሺθ୧, φ୧ሻCUଶሺXଶ െ Xଵሻ,	 ሺ1ሻ	
where	 CUଶ	 denotes	 the	 unitary	 cost	 of	 health	 attention	 for	 each	 coverage	 2	
beneficiary.	
	
Assuming	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 price	 Pଶ ∈ ൣw,w൧,	 we	 define	 wෝሺθ,φ, Pଶሻ ≡
w|wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ൌ Pଶ	 as	 the	 willingness	 to	 pay	 that	 makes	 policyholders	 indifferent	between	purchasing	or	not	purchasing	coverage	2.	For	the	above	reasons,	individuals	
that	purchase	coverage	2	are	those	for	which	wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ൒ wෝሺθ,φ, Pଶሻ.		





8  This  is  a  reduced  form  of  a more  sophisticated model  in which  individuals  choose  directly  a  level  of 
prevention. However, because the goal is not to model the prevention but to understand its consequences, 
a simpler form has been chosen. 
9  The  two  dimensions  in  our  model  are  compatible  with  empiric  and  theoretical  literature  of 
multidimensional  individuals  in  selection scenarios  (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Veiga and Weil, 2014; 
Einav et al., 2013). 
Dଶሺθ,φሻ ൌ න 1൫wሺθ,φሻ ൒ wෝሺθ, φ, Pଶሻ൯
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Dଵሺθ, φሻ ൌ 1 െ Dଶሺθ,φሻ.	
ሺ3ሻ	
	
hതሺθ, φሻ ≡ Eሾhሺθ,φሻሿ	is	the	average	probability	of	illness	that	characterizes	the	
general	 population.	 Policyholders	 who	 benefit	 from	 to	 coverage	 1	 have	 an	 average	
probability	 of	 illness	 of	 hതଵሺθ, φሻ ≡ Eሾhሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ|wሺθ୧, φ୧ሻ ൏ wෝሺθ, φ, Pଶሻሿ;	 and	 people	
who	benefit	 from	 to	 coverage	2	have	 an	 average	probability	of	 illness	of	hതଶሺθ, φሻ ≡





selection	 that	 prevails	 is	 adverse	 ሺadverse	 selection	 if	 hതଵሺθ, φሻ ൏ hതଶሺθ, φሻሻ.	On	 the	
contrary,	 if	 policyholders	 who	 benefit	 from	 coverage	 2	 have	 a	 smaller	 average	
probability	 of	 illness	 ሺthan	 individuals	 in	 coverage	 1ሻ,	 selection	 is	 advantageous	
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both	 coverages	 if	 selection	 is	 advantageous.	 Conversely,	 this	 average	 probability	
decreases	with	a	subsidy	if	selection	is	adverse.	
	
It	 is	assumed	that	 the	premium	associated	with	 the	coverage	2	 is	equal	 to	 its	
actuarial	value,	which	corresponds	to	the	expected	value	of	the	cost	that	the	 insurer	




actuarial	 premium	minus	 the	 amount	 offered	 the	 public	 subsidy.	 Thus,	 the	 price	 of	
enrollment	in	coverage	2	is:	
	
Pଶሺθ, φ, sሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ αሻXଶCUଶhതଶሺθ, φሻ െ s.	
ሺ6ሻ	
	
Because	 a	 positive	 subsidy	 reduces	 the	 price	 paid,	 this	 implies	 that,	 ceteris	
paribus,	more	 individuals	will	purchase	coverage	2.	 If	 the	selection	 is	advantageous,	
individuals	 that	 change	 coverages	 because	 of	 the	 subsidy	 are	 those	 coverage	 1	







Gሺθ, φ; sሻሻ 	ൌ XଵCTଵሺθ, φ, sሻ ൅ αXଶCTଶሺθ, φ, sሻ ൅ sሾDଶሺθ, φ, sሻሿ,	
ሺ7ሻ	
where	 CT୧ሺθ, φ, sሻ ൌ CU୧hത୧ሺθ, φ, sሻD୧ሺθ, φ, sሻ	 is	 the	 total	 cost	 generated	 by	 the	
beneficiaries	of	coverage	level	i	with	i ∈ 	 ሼ1,2ሽ.	Therefore,	the	demand	for	coverages	1	
                                                            
10 A fair actuarial premium  is chosen  for simplification purposes  (assuming competitive market) therefore, 
strategic behavior of firms who offer coverage 2, considering the government subsidy, is not considered. If 
we assume a utility margin  that  insurance  companies  charge  in  the premium, our  results do not  change 
qualitatively. 
and	 2	 ሺequations	 ሺ2ሻ	 and	 ሺ3ሻሻ	 and	 the	 average	 probabilities	 of	 coverage	 1	 and	 2	
beneficiaries	 ሺequations	 ሺ4ሻ	 and	 ሺ5ሻሻ	 also	 depend	 on	 the	 government	 subsidy.	 We	





Gሺθ, φ; sሻ ൌ XଵCUଵhതଵሺθ, φ, sሻሾ1 െ Dଶሺθ,φ, sሻሿ ൅ αXଶCUଶhതଶሺθ, φ, sሻDଶሺθ, φ, sሻ
൅ sሾDଶሺθ, φ, sሻሿ.	
ሺ8ሻ	
	













ଶሺsሻሺ1 െ 	fሾwෝሺsሻሿሻ െ hሾwෝሺsሻሿቃ ሾαXଶCUଶ െ XଵCUଵሿ	
ሺ9.2ሻ	
൅1 െ Fሾwෝሺsሻሿ െ fሾwෝሺsሻሿ ୢ୵ෝሺୱሻୢୱ s.	
ሺ9.3ሻ	
The	 three	 components	 of	 expression	 ሺ9ሻ	 allow	 us	 to	 predict	 the	 effect	 of	 a	
subsidy.	It	 is	known	that	∂wෝሺsሻ ∂s⁄ ൏ 0	due	to	the	fact	that	a	subsidy	initially	lowers	
the	price	of	coverage	2	as	seen	in	ሺ6ሻ.	In	an	adverse	selection	scenario,	hതଶሺsሻ ൐ hതଵሺsሻ	
which	 means	 that	 ሺ9.1ሻ	 will	 be	 negative	 when	 1 ൐ fሾwෝሺsሻሿ.	 In	 an	 advantageous	
selection	scenario	ሺ9.1ሻ	will	be	positive11	when	1 ൐ fሾwෝሺsሻሿ.	The	sign	of	ሺ9.2ሻ	depends	
on	 the	 articulation	between	 coverages	 ሺαሻ	 and	 the	 sign	of	 the	 expression	hതଶሺsሻሺ1 െ




iሻ When	 selection	 is	 advantageous,	 public	 expense	 increases	 with	 the	












The	 first	 ሺiሻ	 statement	 in	 Proposition	 1	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 when	 the	
selection	 is	 advantageous	 ሺ9.1ሻ	 is	 positive,	 while	 the	 sign	 of	 ሺ9.2ሻ	 depends	 on	 the	
articulation	between	 coverages.	More	precisely,	when	 the	 articulation	 is	 sufficiently	
complementary	then	αXଶCUଶ ൐ XଵCUଵ	and	ሺ9.2ሻ	is	positive.	In	such	a	case,	the	subsidy	
increases	 public	 expenses	 unambiguously.	 It	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 when	 there	 is	
advantageous	 selection,	 subsidy	 raises	 the	 average	 probability	 of	 illness	 of	




The	second	statement	ሺiiሻ	 is	particularly	 interesting	because	 it	points	out	 the	
complex	interaction	between	the	articulation	nature	and	the	adverse	selection.	It	can	
be	seen	 that	 ሺ9.1ሻ	 is	always	negative	when	 there	 is	adverse	selection,	while	 ሺ9.3ሻ	 is	
always	positive.	Consider	the	case	where	the	demand	is	sufficiently	inelastic,	such	that	
ሺ9.3ሻ	does	not	generate	a	first‐order	effect	and	that	adverse	selection	is	strong	enough	
to	 ensure	 that	 hതଶሺsሻሺ1 െ 	fሾwෝሺsሻሿሻ ൐ hሾwෝሺsሻሿ.	 In	 such	 a	 case,	 it	 yields	 that	 ሺ9.2ሻ	 is	
negative	 when	 the	 articulation	 is	 sufficiently	 complementary,	 that	 is,	 if	 αXଶCUଶ ൐
XଵCUଵ.	As	the	subsidy	decreases	the	average	probabilities	of	individuals	in	both	levels	
of	coverage	in	the	adverse	selection	scenario,	then	a	greater	complementarity	implies	
a	 reduction	 of	 pubic	 expense	 because	 it	 causes	 a	 positive	 externality,	 that	 is,	 this	
decrease	of	average	probability	of	illness	of	coverage	2	beneficiaries	lower	the	amount	
of	expenditure	funded	by	public	resources.	On	the	contrary,	when	adverse	selection	is	
not	 so	 strong,	 ሺ9.2ሻ	 is	 only	 negative	 if	 the	 articulation	 between	 both	 coverages	 is	
sufficiently	supplementary.		
The	third	statement	ሺiiiሻ	in	Proposition	1	shows	that	there	are	other	scenarios	
in	 which	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expenditure	 is	 ambiguous.	 Next	 section	





The	 Colombian	 heath	 system	 is	 an	 ideal	 scenario	 to	 simulate	 our	 theoretical	
model.	 In	 Colombia,	 a	 public	 health	 insurance	 system	 coexists	 with	 a	
voluntary/private	 insurance	market.	 According	 to	official	 figures,	 in	2012,	 9.65%	of	
the	 public	 health	 system	 beneficiaries	 had	 a	 private	 insurance	 policy.12	 The	 public	
system	 fee	 ሺUnit	 of	 Payment	 for	 Capitation‐UPCሻ	 is	 determined	 according	 to	 the	
gender,	 age,	 and	 location	of	 the	beneficiary.	 It	 is	568,944	COP	on	average.13	For	 the	




Flowchart	 1	 shows	 all	 of	 the	 steps	 taken	 as	 a	 calibration	 strategy.	A	 random	
number	sequence	was	generated	to	simulate	a	uniform	distribution	of	parameters	θ	
and	 φ	 with	 θ, φ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ.14	 Based	 on	 this	 information	 the	 following	 functions	 are	
estimated:	 hሺθ, φሻ ൌ 1 ൫1 ൅ expሺkφ െ θሻ൯⁄ 	 and	ωሺθ, φሻ ൌ θ ൅ φ,	with	 k ൐ 0.	 k	 is	 the	
parameter	 that	 stand	 for	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 selection,	 where	 k ൏ 1	 stands	 for	 the	
scenarios	 of	 adverse	 selection	 while	 k ൐ 1	 stands	 for	 scenarios	 of	 advantageous	
selection.	 Finally,	 when	 k ൌ 1	 no	 selection	 type	 prevails.	 The	 data	 is	 calibrated	
according	to	the	information	observed	for	the	Colombian	health	system	on	2012.15	
At	this	stage,	we	do	not	make	any	assumptions	regarding	the	value	of	k	and	the	
functional	 forms	 of	 hሺθ, φሻ	 and	 ωሺθ, φሻ	 are	 used	 to	 stand	 for	 the	 adverse,	




and	 assuming	 that	 initially	 there	 is	 no	 subsidy,	 we	 find	 the	 value	 of	 α∗ ൌ 1 െ
ൣሺXଶ െ Xଵሻωሺθ, φሻ Xଶhതଶሺθ, φ, 0ሻ⁄ ൧	 for	 each	 of	 the	 selection	 scenarios	 that	 solves	 the	
equilibrium	 price	 observed	 in	 Colombia	 in	 2012	 ሺPଶ ൌ 2.270.000ሻ.	 With	 this	 value	





or	 complementary.	 Figure	 1	 shows	 the	 probability	 distribution	 of	 illness	 for	
individuals	 that	purchase,	or	do	not,	private	 insurance	 for	different	values	of	k.	This	



















subsidy	 on	 public	 expenses	 without	 any	 changes	 in	α∗,	 i.e.	 taking	 as	 given	 the	
articulation	 between	 coverages	 that	 emanated	 from	 the	 calibration	 strategy.	 The	






one,	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 subsidy	 is	 simulated	 as	 a	 policy	 tool	 that	 generates	
migration	of	 individuals	 from	coverage	1	 to	coverage	2,	without	any	changes	on	the	
degree	of	articulation	between	coverages.16	Figure	3	depicts	the	effect	of	the	subsidy	
on	public	 expenditure	according	 to	 the	nature	of	 the	prevailing	 selection	 type.	Each	
colored	 line	 represents	 the	 government’s	 expense	 function	 relative	 to	 the	 level	 of	
public	subsidy.	The	two	uppermost	ሺblue	and	redሻ	are	the	adverse	selection	scenarios;	
the	 middle	 line	 ሺgreenሻ	 is	 the	 neutral	 selection	 scenario;	 and	 the	 lowermost	 lines	
ሺyellow	and	greyሻ	represent	the	advantageous	selection	scenarios.	For	each	selection	
scenario	proposed	there	is	a	unique	degree	of	complementarity	ሺα∗ሻ	between	the	two	
coverages	 that	 allows	 a	 simulation	 of	 the	 observed	 equilibrium	 prices	 in	 the	
Colombian	market	 in	 2012	 ሺpresented	 in	 Table	 1ሻ.	 It	 can	 be	 noticed	 that	 the	more	
adverse	the	selection	scenario	is,	the	greater	the	value	of	alpha;	however,	no	value	is	
equal	to	zero	or	to	the	highest	possible	value	for	alpha	ሺα ൌ Xଵ/Xଶሻ.	 In	other	words,	
there	 is	 no	 scenario	 of	 a	 completely	 complementary	 or	 completely	 supplementary	
bond,	 but	 rather	 a	mixed	 scenario	 ሺcomplementary‐supplementaryሻ.17	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	it	can	be	seen	that	advantageous	selection	scenarios	have	more	supplementary	
levels	of	articulation	than	adverse	selection	scenarios.	
Result	1.	 In	 the	Colombian	scenario,	when	the	nature	of	 the	selection	 is	more	







market  also  offer  coverage  in  the  public  insurance market, which means  they  have  incentives  to  report 
accounting  information  within  the  coverage  of  the  public  insurance.  The  second  reason  is  that  the 
government doesn’t monitor  the voluntary  insurance market. Government’s  information  systems are not 
effective and are subject to the information reported by the private insurance companies. 




parameters	 in	Colombia	 for	2012.	The	dotted	horizontal	 line	 is	 the	estimated	public	




















coverages	 is	made,	from	α∗	to	 	α,	greater	or	 less	than	α∗.	This	works	proposes	α	as	a	
policy	tool	because	it	can	be	modified	through	health	system	legislation.	In	Colombia,	
for	 instance,	 there	 was	 a	 proposal	 made	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 and	 Social	
Protection	 to	 modify	 the	 articulation	 between	 public	 insurance	 and	 voluntary	
ሺprivateሻ	coverages	towards	a	purely	supplementary	articulation.		
















of	 articulation	 between	 coverages	 through	 different	 values	 of	 alpha.	 The	maximum	
corresponds	to	0.89	ሺα ൌ Xଵ/Xଶሻ,	in	this	case	articulation	is	purely	complementary.	It	
corresponds	 to	 the	 fuchsia	 line	 in	 Figures	 4	 and	 5.	 The	minimum	 value	 for	 α	 is	 0,	
which	happens	when	articulation	is	purely	supplementary;	it	corresponds	to	the	blue	
line	 in	 figures	4	and	5.	For	mixed	articulation,	other	values	of	α	between	 these	 two	
limits	 are	 simulated.	 Each	 figure	 has	 a	 dotted	 black	 line	 that	 corresponds	 to	 basal	
public	expense	amount	in	the	scenario	of	no	subsidy	and	without	changes	in	α∗	so	that	
the	 area	 bellow	 the	 dotted	 line	 corresponds	 to	 the	 different	 values	 of	 subsidy	 and	




the	 scenario	where	 the	highest	 intensity	of	adverse	selection	 is	 simulated	ሺkൌ0.33ሻ.	
For	 this	 scenario	 α∗ ൌ 0.73	 because	 the	 only	 value	 of	 α	 that	 comprises	 a	 rise	 in	
complementarity	of	coverages	is	α ൌ 0.89,	which	corresponds	to	a	situation	of	perfect	
complementarity.	 The	 other	 simulated	 values	 of	 α	 correspond	 to	 increases	 in	
supplementarity	of	articulation.	This	 figure	ሺ4.Aሻ	corresponds	to	the	scenario	where	
there	is	a	greater	quantity	of	subsidy	amounts	that	allow	for	public	expenses	to	reduce	
ሺarea	 under	 the	 dotted	 lineሻ.	 Figure	 4.B	 describes	 a	 scenario	 with	 less	 intensity	 of	
adverse	selection	that	also	has	less	complementarity	relative	to	the	previous	scenario.	
In	 this	 scenario	 it	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 that	 plenty	 subsidy	 amounts	 can	 reduce	 public	
expenditure.	 The	 simulation	 results	 presented	 in	 figures	 4.A	 and	 4.B	 confirm	 the	
findings	in	the	theoretical	model,	specifically	as	described	in	section	ሺiiሻ	of	Proposition	
1.	 That	 is,	 that	 in	 scenarios	 of	 adverse	 selection	 there	 are	 different	 options	 for	
reducing	public	expenses	through	a	subsidy	policy	together	with	a	change	in	coverage	
articulation,	towards	a	more	supplementary	articulation	ሺlower	αሻ.	
Result	 3.	 In	 the	 Colombian	 scenario,	 there	 are	 different	 options	 in	 which	 a	
subsidy	can	reduce	public	expenditure,	these	correspond	to	a	combination	of	changes	
in	articulation	of	coverages	 towards	more	supplementary	scenarios,	 together	with	a	
certain	 subsidy	 level.	 It	 is	more	 likely	 for	 a	 subsidy	 to	 reduce	 expenses	 in	 adverse	
selection	scenarios.	
Figures	5.A	and	5.B	correspond	to	advantageous	selection	scenarios.	Figure	5.A	
is	 the	 scenario	 where	 the	 highest	 intensity	 of	 advantageous	 selection	 is	 simulated	
ሺkൌ2ሻ.	For	this	scenario	α∗ ൌ 0.41	so	that	three	of	the	simulated	values	of	change	in	α	
correspond	 to	 increases	 in	 complementarity	 of	 coverages	 ሺα ൌ 0.89,	α ൌ 0.71,	
α ൌ 0.53ሻ.	It	can	be	seen	that	for	this	scenario	there	are	less	values	of	the	subsidy	that	
reduce	public	 expenses.	 In	Figure	5.B	 there	are	more	values	of	 the	 subsidy	 that	are	






The	 only	 goal	 of	 the	 last	 numerical	 exercise	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 three	 terms	 of	
equation	ሺ9ሻ,	which	correspond	to	 the	decomposition	of	 the	effect	of	 the	subsidy	on	















it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 first	 term	 is	 always	 negative	 in	 advantageous	 selection	 and	
positive	 in	adverse	selection	scenarios.	In	the	neutral	selection	scenario,	this	term	is	
almost	 zero.	Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 term	 includes	 the	difference	between	 average	
probabilities	of	illness	between	individuals	in	the	two	different	coverages,	it	captures	










2.  It  can  be  seen  that  there  are  differences  in magnitude,  nevertheless  conclusions  drawn  from  these 
simulations are the same that those drawn from a uniform distribution. 
20 For this exercise a uniform distribution was employed for θ and φ, simulating a population 10 times bigger 









key	 determinants	 of	 this	 impact	 are	 analyzed:	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 selection	 and	 the	
degree	 of	 articulation	 between	 coverages.	 Taking	 into	 account	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	
individuals	in	two	dimensions,	related	to	the	inherited	risk	of	illness	and	preferences	
for	 preventive	 activities,	 a	 theoretical	 model	 is	 developed	 which	 allows	 us	 to	
determine	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 a	 subsidy	 decreases	 public	 spending.	
Furthermore	 a	 numerical	 simulation	was	made	 in	 order	 to	 recreate	 the	 Colombian	
scenario.	
The	 theoretical	 model	 reveals	 that	 in	 advantageous	 selection	 scenarios,	 the	
subsidy	can	increase	public	expenditure	if	coverage	articulation	is	complementary.	On	
the	 other	 hand,	 in	 adverse	 selection	 scenarios,	 a	 subsidy	 can	 reduce	 spending	 if	





there	 is	no	positive	subsidy	 that	can	diminish	public	 system	expenditure,	no	matter	
what	the	scenario	is.	Nonetheless,	a	combination	of	subsidy	and	changes	in	coverage	
articulation	 could	 diminish	 public	 spending,	 mainly	 in	 adverse	 selection	 scenarios.	
This	 work	 leads	 to	 an	 interesting	 result	 which	 is	 the	 idea	 of	 using	 the	 articulation	
between	 public	 and	 private	 coverages	 as	 a	 public	 policy	 tool	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	
reduce	public	expenditure.		
This	work	does	not	take	into	account	the	oligopolistic	structure	in	coverage	2	
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  Adverse selection  No selection  Advantageous selection 
Parameter k  0,33  0,5  1  1,5  2 
hത2ሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,637  0,603  0,498  0,393  0,298 
hത1ሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,575  0,556  0,500  0,446  0,398 
α∗  0,728  0,712  0,651  0,558  0,418 
CU2  $14.529.919,38  $14.529.919,38 $14.529.919,38 $14.529.919,38  $14.529.919,38






Subsidy Coverage 1  Coverage 2  Total Population 
 $                    ‐     16.851  1.799  18.650 
 $           10.000   16.798  1.852  18.650 
 $           20.000   16.742  1.908  18.650 
 $           50.000   16.566  2.084  18.650 
 $         100.000   16.255  2.395  18.650 

























Figure	 1	 describes	 three	 scenarios.	 Aሻ	 Adverse	 selection	 scenario,	 with	 k൏1.	
The	 average	 probability	 of	 illness	 of	 individuals	 who	 benefit	 from	 coverage	 2	 is	
greater	 than	 that	 of	 the	 individuals	 who	 benefit	 from	 coverage	 1.	 Bሻ	 No	 selection	







Three	 scenarios:	 Aሻ	 Adverse	 selection	 scenario,	 with	 k൏1.	 Bሻ	 No	 selection	
scenario,	 with	 kൌ1.	 Cሻ	 Advantageous	 selection	 scenario	 ሺk൐1ሻ.	 The	 red	 line	
corresponds	to	the	value	wෝ ൌ 2.270.000.	
	 	





One	 can	 see	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 the	 expenditure	 function	 according	 to	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 selection	 without	 changes	 in	 the	 equilibrium	 articulation	 level.	 Each	
colored	line	represents	the	expenditure	function	for	a	different	selection	scenario.	The	











The	 effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	 spending	 can	 be	 seen	 for	 different	 levels	 of	
articulation	between	coverages	ሺvalues	of	alphaሻ	 in	adverse	selection	scenarios.	The	
dotted	 line	 represents	 the	 simulated	 value	 of	 public	 expenditure	without	 a	 subsidy	
and	with	α∗	that	 is	unique	for	each	selection	scenario.	4.A.	Scenario	with	the	highest	
intensity	 of	 adverse	 selection	 ሺkൌ0.33ሻ.	 α∗ ൌ 0.73.	 The	 basal	 value	 of	 public	
expenditure	 is	 $20.518.706.720,64.	 4.B.	 Scenario	 with	 less	 intensity	 of	 adverse	









Figure	 5.	 One	 can	 see	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expenditure	 for	 different	
levels	 of	 articulation	 between	 coverages	 ሺvalues	 of	 alphaሻ	 in	 scenarios	 of	
advantageous	 selection.	 The	 dotted	 line	 represents	 the	 simulated	 value	 of	 public	
expenditure	without	a	subsidy	and	with	α∗	that	is	unique	for	each	selection	scenario;	
under	 this	 line	 there	 are	 savings	 in	 public	 spending.	 5.A.	 Scenario	with	 the	 highest	
intensity	 of	 advantageous	 selection	 ሺkൌ2ሻ.	 α∗ ൌ 0.41.	 The	 basal	 value	 of	 public	
expenditure	 is	$12.540.415.534,67.	5.B.	Scenario	with	 less	 intensity	of	advantageous	
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Inverse	 transform	 sampling	 is	 used	 to	 randomly	 generated	 data	 with	 a	 uniform	
distribution	 for	 θ	 and	φ,	with	 θ	φ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ.	 Based	 on	 this	 data,	 simulation	 is	 done	 in	
Excel	 for	 different	 distributions	 with	 parameters	 known	 for	 these	 two	 dimensions	
which	characterize	individuals.		





2. Regarding	 public	 expenditure,	 the	 scenario	 that	 is	 closest	 to	 the	 observed	
results	for	Colombia	is	the	adverse	selection	scenario.	
3. Only	a	change	in	the	articulation	policy	between	coverages,	together	with	the	








  Adverse selection  No selection  Advantageous selection 
Parameter k  0,33  0,5  1  1,5  2 
hതଶሺθ,φ, 0ሻ  0,646  0,611  0,500  0,390  0,291 
hതଵሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,563  0,546  0,499  0,456  0,417 
α∗  0,720  0,703  0,638  0,535  0,377 
CUଶ   $  13.921.532,83    $  13.921.532,83   $  13.921.532,83   $  13.921.532,83    $  13.921.532,83 



























  Adverse selection  No selection  Advantageous selection 
Parameter k  0,33  0,5  1  1,5  2 
hതଶሺθ,φ, 0ሻ  0,653  0,616  0,501  0,387  0,286 
hതଵሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,603  0,577  0,500  0,424  0,354 
α∗  0,703  0,686  0,614  0,500  0,323 
CUଶ   $  13.033.152,93    $  13.033.152,93   $  13.033.152,93   $  13.033.152,93    $  13.033.152,93 





























  Adverse selection  No selection  Advantageous selection 
Parameter k  0,33  0,5  1  1,5  2 
hതଶሺθ,φ, 0ሻ  0,680  0,637  0,500  0,364  0,248 
hതଵሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,659  0,620  0,500  0,380  0,273 
α∗  0,643  0,619  0,515  0,334  0,020 
CUଶ   $  10.395.267,90    $  10.395.267,90   $  10.395.267,90   $  10.395.267,90    $  10.395.267,90 


























  Adverse selection  No selection  Advantageous selection 
Parameter k  0,33  0,5  1  1,5  2 
hതଶሺθ,φ, 0ሻ  0,670  0,614  0,507  0,449  0,413 
hതଵሺθ, φ, 0ሻ  0,563  0,546  0,502  0,466  0,436 
α∗  0,515  0,470  0,359  0,276  0,212 
CUଶ   $     7.755.411,47    $     7.755.411,47   $     7.755.411,47   $     7.755.411,47    $    7.755.411,47 




Effect	 of	 the	 subsidy	 on	 public	 expenditure	 for	 each	 prevailing	 selection	 scenario,	
leaving	α∗	unchanged.	
	
	
	 	
Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	with	changes	in	the	level	of	articulation	
between	coverages	in	adverse	selection	scenarios	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
Effect	of	the	subsidy	on	public	expenditure	with	changes	in	the	level	of	articulation	
between	coverages	in	advantageous	selection	scenarios	
	
	
	
	
	
 
	
